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ABSTRACT
The recent and widespread availability of affordable
mobile phone technology in developing countries has paved
the way for the development of a number of mobile money
and electronic remittance services. One of the most
successful of these services is Safaricom’s M-PESA
program, launched in the East African nation of Kenya in
March 2007. Since then, the program has successfully
enrolled 15.2 million users, transferred more than US$1.4
trillion in electronic funds, and contributed significantly to
poverty alleviation and financial inclusion efforts in rural
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Kenya. This Article seeks to trace the development of MPESA in Kenya, provide a snapshot of the Kenyan
implementation of and experience with the program, and
consider the role that services like M-PESA might play in
national and international anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
“The adoption of mobile phones has occurred at perhaps the
fastest rate and to the deepest level of any consumer-level
technology in history.” 1 The fixed line telephone—the predecessor
to mobile phones—took 100 years to reach only 80 percent of the
population, even in developed countries. 2 Meanwhile, mobile
phones have been adopted “more than five times as fast”3
worldwide, and have significantly decreased communication costs
in many parts of the developing world.
Nowhere is the benefit and impact of widely available mobile
phone technology more apparent than in Africa, “where
[alternatives to mobile phones such as] networks of both fixed line
communication and physical transportation infrastructure are often
inadequate, unreliable, and dilapidated.” 4 The adoption of mobile
phone technology “in Africa has increased from 3 percent in 2002
to 51 percent today, and is expected to reach 72 percent by 2014.” 5
1

William Jack & Tavneet Suri, Mobile Money: The Economics of M-PESA
2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16721, 2011), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16721.
2
Id. at 3.
3
Id. at 2-3.
4
Id. at 2.
5
Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Mobile Payments Go Viral: M-PESA in
Kenya, 32 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 169, 172 (2011), available at
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As a result, affordable access to mobile phone technology has
allowed a number of African nations to “leap-frog the [line] en
route to 21st century connectivity.” 6
However, the positive impact of the adoption of cellular
technology has not been limited to the communications or
information technology sectors of developing countries. In fact, the
successful development of mobile money services in Kenya
provides a unique and interesting case study of how access to
mobile phones can revolutionize and democratize the financial and
banking industries of developing nations.
Currently, there are more Kenyans who own a mobile phone
than have access to a bank account. In this respect, Kenya is not an
exceptional case. Worldwide, only “one billion of the world’s 6.5
billion people have bank accounts . . . yet about three billion have
mobile phones.” 7 This global lack of access to financial services,
combined with the increasingly widespread use of mobile phones,
has given rise to an informal practice of using mobile phones as an
alternative to traditional banking systems. Mobile phone users can
transfer funds to other users through pre-paid mobile phone credits
sent via short message service (SMS) communication. Upon
receipt, these credits are exchanged for cash or traded for goods
and services in a type of informal, mobile phone based economy
that provides basic financial services to otherwise unserved or
unbanked populations.
Seeking to improve and formalize this funds-transfer system,
Safaricom—Kenya’s leading mobile service provider and an
affiliate of the Vodafone Group—launched its M-PESA service.
M-PESA, short for mobile money, 8 is an SMS-based money
transfer system that allows individuals to deposit, send, and
withdraw funds using only their mobile phones. In the M-PESA
system, Safaricom accepts cash deposits from customers who are

http://www.capco.com/sites/all/files/journal-32_article-16.pdf.
6
Jack & Suri, supra note 1, at 2.
7
Briana Sapp, Mobile Phones Revolutionise Banking, INTER PRESS
SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, May 23, 2007, available at http://www.ipsnews.net/
2007/05/finance-africa-mobile-phones-revolutionise-banking/.
8
Pesa is Swahili for money.
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registered M-PESA users. 9 In exchange for their deposits, users are
issued “e-float” or “e-money” that is held in the user’s electronic
account. The e-money issued is a shilling-for-shilling
representation of actual deposited cash, which is held in trust. Emoney can then be transferred, used to pay for goods and services,
or withdrawn. 10
After its launch in 2007, the M-PESA program grew rapidly
and reached approximately 65 percent of Kenyan households by
the end of 2009. 11 The program provided desperately needed
access to reliable financial services and markedly improved the
economic productivity of many impoverished communities
throughout Kenya. As a result, the program was widely viewed as
a model of success to be emulated across the developing world.
However, the unique and uncontroverted success of M-PESA as a
financial inclusion and poverty alleviation program in Kenya has
been difficult to replicate in other developing nations. 12
This Article seeks to: (I) analyze relevant demographic
information concerning the population of Kenya that might shed
light on the financial needs of Kenya’s consumers and provide
explanations for the extraordinary success of Kenya’s M-PESA
9

Int’l Fin. Corp., M-Money Channel Distribution Case – Kenya 1 (World
Bank Grp., Case Study Tool 6.7, 2011).
10
Id. (“Registration and deposits are free and most other transactions are
priced based on a tiered structure to allow even the poorest users to be able to
use the system at a reasonable cost. Transaction values are typically small,
ranging from USD 5 to USD 30.”); Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 5, at 170
(“[Retail] stores are paid a fee by Safaricom each time they exchange [cash for
M-PESA credit] on behalf of customers.”).
11
Jack & Suri, supra note 1, at 5 (“The average number of new registrations
per day exceeded 5,000 in August 2007, and reached nearly 10,000 in December
that year . . . [b]y August 2009, a stock of about 7.7 million M-PESA accounts
had been registered. There are now about 23,000 agents, and data from late 2009
indicated that even by then more than two-thirds of Kenyan households had at
least one member who used the service.”).
12
For a discussion of the difficulty of replicating the success of M-PESA in
Kenya and some explanations of this result, see, e.g., Gunnar Camner & Emil
Sjöblom, Can the Success of M-PESA Be Repeated? – A Review of the
Implementations in Kenya and Tanzania, VALUABLE BITS (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.mobileactive.org/files/file_uploads/camner_sjoblom_differences_ke
_tz.pdf.
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program; (II) trace the development of M-PESA in Kenya since its
inception in 2003; (III) provide a snapshot of Kenya’s
implementation of the M-PESA program to date; and (IV) discuss
some of the future challenges facing M-PESA, including the role
that M-PESA and Safaricom might play in international antimoney laundering and counter-terrorist financing efforts.
I. KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER, KNOW YOUR COUNTRY: KENYA’S
DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE STATE OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION PRIOR
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF M-PESA
Although the success of M-PESA in Kenya is unprecedented
and attributable largely to Safaricom’s innovative business model
and marketing strategy, some have suggested that M-PESA’s
effectiveness was enhanced due to the demographic characteristics
of the Kenyan consumer and Kenyan society that existed prior to
M-PESA’s launch. 13 Therefore, the state of affairs that gave rise to
M-PESA’s success and inspired its development is worthy of brief
consideration here.
A. The Kenyan Demand for Remittance Services: Kenya’s Pattern
of Urbanization and the “Dual System”
The term “dual system” is used to describe the continued
connection that urban migrants maintain with their rural homes and
villages, despite spending a significant amount of time living or
working in urban centers. 14 The reasons for these sustained
connections are multifold and include their ability to “ease the
transition to urban life.” 15 However, the explanation for these
strong urban-rural connections that most concerns this Article is a
financial one. Due to the severe disparity between urban and rural
13

See, e.g., Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 5.
Olga Morawczynski, Surviving in the “Dual System”: How M-PESA is
Fostering Urban-to-Rural Remittances in a Kenyan Slum 2 (Univ. of Edinburgh,
Soc.
Studies
Unit,
Working
Paper,
2008),
available
at
http://www.mobileactive.org/files/file_uploads/Olga_Morawczynski-M-PESA2008.pdf.
15
Id.
14

2013]

SAFARICOM AND M-PESA IN KENYA:
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND FINANCIAL INTEGRITY

381

wages, many laborers and household breadwinners migrate from
rural centers to urban areas without their families in search of more
lucrative employment opportunities. As a result, many rural
households rely on remittances from urban centers for survival; the
two societies become interconnected as a matter of economic
necessity. 16
Kenya provides a particularly compelling example of this “dual
system.” In Kenya, “30 percent of households . . . depend on
remittances for their survival,” 17 and over 78 percent of Kenya’s
population lives in rural households. As such, Kenya’s consumer
market expressed a meaningful demand for urban-to-rural
remittance services prior to the implementation of M-PESA. In
fact, some have suggested the urban-to-rural population ratio in
Kenya struck a serendipitous balance that generated the largest
possible demand for the domestic remittance services offered by
M-PESA.
A recent study of demand patterns for remittance services in
developing nations suggests “the potential market size for domestic
remittances is related to urbanization ratios. More propitious
[domestic remittance] markets will be those where the process of
rural-urban migration is sufficiently rooted to produce large
migration flows, but not so advanced that rural communities are
hollowed out.” 18 Kenya’s history, culture, and public policy have
functioned together to establish and maintain this demandproducing urban-to-rural population ratio. During Kenya’s colonial
period, policies were implemented in the hopes of preventing the
establishment of permanent urban centers. For example, in urban
areas, labor was only recruited for temporary periods, wages were
kept low, and only small accommodations not suitable for family
living were available. As a result, “migrant workers would
oscillate between . . . urban and rural area[s] throughout their
working life.” 19
16

Id.
Id.
18
Amrik Heyer & Ignacio Mas, Seeking Fertile Grounds for Mobile Money
5-6 (Bill & Melinda Gates Found., Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://mmublog.org/wp-content/files_mf/fertile_grounds_mobile_money.pdf.
19
Morawczynski, supra note 14, at 4.
17
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Kenya’s post-colonial government reversed these policies and
sought to jumpstart economic development through a nation-wide
program of urbanization. Subsequently, urban wages and the
number of permanent residents in urban areas significantly
increased. The impact of these policies was, however, muted due
to the significant and sustaining links maintained by urban workers
to their rural homes and rural communities. As explained by a
number of scholars in the area, “In Kenya, migrants’ ties with
[their] rural homes [are especially strong due to] an ethnic . . .
conception of citizenship . . . expressed through burial, inheritance,
cross-generational dependencies, social insurance, and other ties,
even in cases where migrants reside more or less permanently in
cities.” 20
Despite government policies seeking to increase urbanization,
there was not an unsustainable drain of workers from rural areas to
urban centers in Kenya. Instead, migrating workers continued to
send funds to their rural homes and support the rural communities
that they left in search of employment. This cultural phenomenon
is not unique to Kenya. In fact, a strong tie to rural homes is part of
the community spirit embodied in many African cultures.
Nevertheless, there exists an especially strong demand for
domestic remittance services in Kenya, due to its history, culture,
and pattern of population growth.
B. Challenges Faced by Kenya’s Financial Service Providers in
Meeting the Kenyan Consumer’s Demand for Remittance
Services
Prior to Safaricom’s M-PESA launch, Kenyans had a number
of options for local remittance services. These services included
“commercial banks, post offices, forex bureaus, bus companies,
and friends and family.” 21 Almost all of these options, however,
were either unavailable to the majority of Kenya’s consumers or
were extremely unreliable and insecure.
The most commonly used remittance services—informal friend
20
21

Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 5, at 173.
Morawczynski, supra note 14, at 2.

2013]

SAFARICOM AND M-PESA IN KENYA:
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND FINANCIAL INTEGRITY

383

and family networks and courier services provided by Kenya’s bus
companies—risked the potential of lost or stolen funds and,
occasionally, required the payment of prohibitively high fees. 22
Similarly, the Kenyan postal service, although traditionally a
popular method for transferring funds to rural communities, “is
perceived by customers as costly, slow, and prone to liquidity
shortages at rural outlets.” 23
Finally, the ability to transfer funds through a commercial bank
is substantially impaired by the fact that only an extreme minority
of rural Kenyans has access to a bank account with which to
receive remitted funds. Therefore, even with a number of
remittance services available to them, most Kenyans experienced
“service gaps, inefficiencies, and unmet demand, particularly
among the low-income population.” 24
C. Confidence in Safaricom and the Ubiquity of Mobile Phones in
Kenya
The development and implementation of a new payment
system, such as M-PESA, is generally faced with a number of
financial, cultural, and logistical challenges, not least of which is
attracting users to the service and ensuring that they will trust their
money to a previously unknown and untested commercial entity.
At least in this area, Safaricom had a head start prior to M-PESA’s
commercial launch.
Established in 2000 with 17,000 customers and only 50
employees, Safaricom has grown into one of the most accessible
and well-recognized brands in Kenya. Today, Safaricom employs
over 3,000 individuals and offers services to more than 16 million
customers. In Kenya, almost 83 percent of the population who are
fifteen years or older have access to a mobile phone 25 and
Safaricom is responsible for a significant portion of that
22

Id. at 10.
Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 5, at 174.
24
Kamau Kabbucho et al., Passing the Buck: Money Transfer Systems: The
Practice and Potential for Products in Kenya v DAI (May 2003), http://dai.com/
sites/default/files/pubs/other/Passing_the_Buck.pdf.
25
Jack & Suri, supra note 1, at 4.
23
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penetration. Safaricom controls nearly 80 percent of the mobile
phone market, placing it significantly ahead of its nearest rivals:
Airtel, Yu, and Orange. 26 As a result, even before the launch of MPESA, Safaricom had developed meaningful brand recognition and
trust with Kenya’s consumers upon which to build its remittance
service.
D. Kenya’s Consumer Profile
Of course, there are a number of other factors relevant to the
viability of financial inclusion services, such as M-PESA, in
Kenya. One important factor is the demographic character of
Kenya’s consumer population. It is relevant to note that Kenya is
home to approximately 39 million people, which is about average
for an African nation. Therefore, Kenya can serve as a useful
model for other countries in this regard. However, Kenya is a
relatively young country; over 42 percent of its population is under
the age of fourteen. It is also important to note that more than 85
percent of Kenya’s population is literate and has had experience
with mobile phone technology. The majority of Kenyans would
most likely be able to adjust to using M-PESA’s text message
services without much difficulty. Finally, an important aspect of
Kenya’s population is its level of employment. Although 17.94
million individuals are included in Kenya’s labor force, the nation
still counts nearly 40 percent of its citizens as unemployed. As a
result, Kenya maintains a relatively high poverty level. Thus, for
any financial service to be successful in Kenya it must not exclude
a significant portion of the country’s consumers by being
prohibitively expensive.
II. M-PESA’S PILOT PROGRAM
Taking these factors into account, Safaricom first launched MPESA in Kenya as part of a six-month pilot program conceived
and developed cooperatively between a number of public and
private entities. The following section seeks to: (A) identify the
26

Id. at 5.
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important corporations and governmental agencies involved in MPESA’s pilot program, (B) explain how the M-PESA pilot program
was implemented in Kenya, and (C) mention a few of the lessons
learned as the pilot progressed.
A. The Players: the Role of Vodafone, Safaricom, the United
Kingdom, and the Kenyan Government in M-PESA’s Pilot
Program
M-PESA was conceived of at the 2003 World Summit for
Sustainable Development, when the United Kingdom’s
Department for International Development (DFID) approached a
representative of Vodafone. 27 The U.K. DFID was convinced that
private organizations did not invest more heavily in international
poverty alleviation efforts because poverty alleviation programs
generally require a significant initial investment, but often fail to
generate financial returns commensurate with that investment.
Thus, the DFID believed that if the amount of money necessary for
a program’s initial investment could be sufficiently reduced,
poverty alleviation might become a profitable endeavor that would
unleash the creative energies and logistical resources of some of
the U.K.’s largest companies, such as Vodafone. Following this
line of reasoning, the U.K. DFID developed an innovative use for
the U.K.’s “challenge funds” intended to achieve the United
Nations’ Millennium Development goal of reducing poverty by 50
percent by 2015: subsidizing the investment of private companies
in poverty alleviation efforts.
Putting its ideas into action, the U.K. DFID proposed a number
of public-private partnerships to Vodafone in which private
poverty alleviation efforts in African nations, such as Kenya,
would become more financially attractive to investors by using the
U.K.’s “challenge funds” as a subsidy. 28 One of the DFID’s
proposed partnerships eventually resulted in M-PESA. Vodafone
27

Nick Hughes & Susie Lonie, M-PESA: Mobile Money for the
“Unbanked”: Turning Cellphones into 24-Hour Tellers in Kenya, 2
INNOVATIONS 63, 66 (2007).
28
Id.
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won the bid to head up the DFID’s program and soon after
partnered with the Safaricom team in Kenya to implement the MPESA service.
Safaricom is a publicly traded company registered on the
Nairobi Stock Exchange, but was supported by the Kenyan
government during its development of M-PESA. Following a
financial access survey conducted in 2006, which indicated very
low levels of access to financial services throughout the country,
the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) announced its commitment to
exploring “all reasonable options for correcting the [financial]
access imbalance” and began to work closely with Vodafone and
Safaricom to ensure the success of M-PESA. 29 Perhaps the CBK’s
largest contribution to the pilot program was simply recognizing
that pre-mature regulation of programs like M-PESA might stifle
the industry’s growth. As a result, the CBK imposed almost no
regulatory safeguards on the M-PESA pilot program. 30
B. Implementation of M-PESA’s Pilot Program
The M-PESA pilot program in Kenya, headed by Vodafone
and Safaricom, officially began on October 11, 2005. 31 The pilot
consisted of eight agent stores in three geographically disperse
locations: the Nairobi Central Business District (a well-developed
urban center), Mathare (a slum about 8 kilometers out of the center
of town), and Thika (a rural market town approximately 32
kilometers out of the city).
Initially, M-PESA was conceived of as a means for
microfinance institutions to disburse loans to their customers and
to enable those customers to make loan repayments using their
mobile phones. As a result, Vodafone partnered with Faulu Kenya,
a local micro-finance institution that provided microloans to
individual consumers and small business owners who would repay
their loans, generally, by a few dollars every week. 32 Five hundred
Faulu Kenya clients were enrolled in the pilot program, provided
29

Mas & Radcliffe, supra note 5, at 173.
Id.
31
Int’l Fin. Corp., supra note 9, at 10.
32
Hughes & Lonie, supra note 27, at 70.
30
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with M-PESA-ready phones, and instructed on how to use them to
repay their loans (their incentive for accepting the deal was a free
phone and a few dollars placed in their M-PESA account). 33 As the
pilot progressed, the trial participants recognized and explored the
potential of the M-PESA service. As one Safaricom representative
noted:
Aside from the standard loan repayments for which
we had designed the system, we observed several
other applications: People repaying the loans of
others in return for services; Payment for trading
between businesses; Some of the larger businesses
using M-PESA as an overnight safe because the
banks closed before the agent shops; People
journeying between the pilot areas, depositing cash
at one end, and withdrawing it a few hours later at
the other; People sending airtime purchased by MPESA directly to their relations up country as a kind
of informal remittance; People outside the pilot
population being sent money for various ad hoc
reasons[,] for example, one lady’s husband had
been robbed, so she sent him M-PESA to pay for
his bus fare home; People repaying loans in return
for cash on behalf of a few colleagues who hadn’t
mastered the use of the phone—or simply sold it. 34
Based on this expanded use of the service and the demand from
those outside the program to be involved, Safaricom expanded the
pilot services by allowing users to purchase prepaid airtime at a 5
percent discount if purchased with their deposited M-PESA emoney. Not only did trial participants take advantage of the service
but “a number of customers [set] up as informal airtime resellers as
a side business.” 35
Six months later, on May 1, 2006, the pilot ended. Its success
can be measured, in part, by the fact that “many trial users
33

Id. at 74.
Id. at 76.
35
Id.
34
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continued to transact on the system after [the pilot concluded].” 36
The pilot did present, however, a number of stumbling blocks and
lessons for the full launch.
C. Lessons from the Pilot
The first lesson that became clear from the M-PESA pilot was
that it would not primarily be used as a means to repay microloans.
In fact, Safaricom’s partnership with Faulu Kenya generated more
unnecessary complications than benefits to the consumer. “Many
of their reconciliation methods were manual and paper based and
reconciling M-PESA transactions in parallel with their existing
systems only seemed to add complexity and additional work for
Faulu back-office staff. Furthermore, Faulu was not able to
maintain a stable [I]nternet connection.” 37 Therefore, “Safaricom
decided to proceed with a full commercial launch of the service
without [their] microfinance capabilities.” 38
Additionally, agents involved in the pilot program were
initially hesitant to pay out physical cash based solely upon an MPESA text message. In order to assuage these insecurities for the
full launch, agents were given individual M-PESA cash float
accounts and reassurances from Safaricom’s head offices.
Finally, “consumer training was quickly identified as being
probably the biggest challenge” to a countrywide implementation
of M-PESA. 39 Individuals that were not familiar with mobile
phones needed significant training in order to navigate a mobile
phone’s menu system and the M-PESA application in particular.
Additionally, although many Kenyans were English-speaking,
some, especially those in the rural areas, spoke primarily Swahili
and other tribal languages. Thus, for the full rollout, Safaricom had
to condense these languages that are not as compact as English, to
no more than 160 characters for an SMS message to achieve
optimal levels of customer registration in rural areas. 40 As a result
36

Int’l Fin. Corp., supra note 9, at 10.
Id. at 4.
38
Id.
39
Hughes & Lonie, supra note 27, at 74.
40
Id. at 72-73.
37
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of these efforts, all customer communications are currently in both
English and Swahili.
III. M-PESA LAUNCH AND MEASURING THE PROGRAM’S
SUCCESS IN KENYA
In addition to addressing the problems presented during MPESA’s pilot program, M-PESA’s full launch would also have to
overcome the adverse network effects that plague the
implementation of nearly every new payment system. In order to
overcome these obstacles, prior to the 2007 launch, Safaricom
made a number of “significant up front investment[s]” in the
product, including opening 750 M-PESA providers nation-wide
and ensuring at least one M-PESA agent was available in each of
Kenya’s 69 districts. 41 Further, in order to cement trust and
familiarity with the brand, Safaricom began a nationwide
advertising campaign that included television and radio spots as
well as traveling roadshows that provided customer training in the
use of mobile phone technology and the M-PESA service.
The launch was described as a “massive logistical challenge
that led to a great deal of customer and store confusion and, in the
first months . . . several days’ delays to reach customer service
hotlines.” 42 Yet the gamble paid off and within one month
Safaricom had registered over 20,000 customers for the M-PESA
service. 43 Since the launch of the service, about 15 million new
customers have signed up and used it to transfer over US$1.4
trillion. As a result, M-PESA’s launch in Kenya has been
universally hailed as a success based upon almost any meaningful
vector of comparison.
A. The Rate and Sustained Growth of Customer Registration
One indication of M-PESA’s success is the sheer number of
Kenyans who have chosen to register for the service despite other
41
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remittance services available to them. Between March 2007 (the
date of the program’s full launch) and May 2008, over 2 million
customers registered; and the number of customers “reached the 10
million mark in just over three years [after the service was
launched].” 44 As of December 31, 2011, the reported number of
active M-PESA customers has topped 15.2 million. Currently, out
of Safaricom’s 17 million subscribers, 15.2 million (90 percent)
are registered for M-PESA, which is 63 percent of the adult
population in Kenya. These numbers reflect M-PESA’s
outstanding success as a mechanism of financial inclusion.
B. The Growth of M-PESA Retail Agents in Kenya
The number of M-PESA retail agents in Kenya has grown
almost as quickly as the number of M-PESA clients. During the
first year of service, despite Safaricom’s significant initial
investment in new M-PESA locations, the growth of agents lagged
behind the demand created by an expanding customer base. This
result, however, was partially by design. Since “store revenues are
dependent on the number of transactions they facilitate, Safaricom
was careful not to flood the market with too many outlets, lest it
depress the number of customers per agent.” 45 As of December 30,
2011, the number of M-PESA retail agents has expanded to meet
customer demand and there are now over 35,500 M-PESA agents
in such diverse sectors as supermarkets, fuel stations, and
Safaricom dealers. In fact, there are now “over five times the
number of M-PESA outlets [in Kenya] than the total number of . . .
post offices, bank branches, and automated teller machines
(ATMs).” 46
C. Volume of e-Money Transactions
Another important measure of M-PESA’s success is the
amount of money transferred through its e-money system. Over
two million transactions are conducted over M-PESA every day.
44
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That number constitutes 90 percent of all mobile money
transactions in Kenya and 70 percent of all non-cash financial
transactions. Cumulatively, these transactions amount to more than
US$4.98 billion transferred per year, which accounts for 17
percent of Kenya’s gross domestic product. Over its five-year
history, Safaricom’s M-PESA has moved more than US$1.4
trillion in peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions. As a point of
comparison, M-PESA “processes more transactions domestically
than Western Union does globally.” 47
It is important to note, however, that M-PESA has not replaced
banks in Kenya. In fact, although some traditional banks initially
resisted Safaricom’s implementation of M-PESA, many have
recently developed partnerships with Safaricom to offer the MPESA payment solution to their customers via their own mobile
banking platforms. Nevertheless, the volume of transactions
effected between banks under the Real Time Gross Settlement
(RTGS) method is nearly 700 times the daily value transacted
through M-PESA. 48 On the other hand, the average mobile
transaction is about a hundred times smaller than the average check
transaction (Automated Clearing House, or ACH), and just half the
size of the average ATM transaction. 49
D. Expansion of Services
Since its launch, M-PESA has also expanded beyond its
initially conceived of role as a money transfer service that might
facilitate microloan repayment. The first notable new service was
announced when Safaricom partnered with Pesa Point, one of the
largest ATM service providers in Kenya, and allowed its users to
make a withdrawal from their M-PESA account at any ATM. This
service provided more convenience to consumers who needed to
47
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make a withdrawal after M-PESA’s agents have already closed or
from an agent who did not have enough currency on hand to fulfill
a withdrawal request.
In 2009, Safaricom expanded M-PESA’s services again when
it launched its pay bill service. At least “75 companies [began to
use] M-PESA to collect payments from their customers. The
biggest user is the electric utility company, which now has roughly
20 percent of its one million customers paying through MPESA.” 50 Since then, Safaricom has partnered with 25 banks and
over 700 businesses to facilitate fund deposits, bank transfers and
the regular payment of utility bills, insurance premiums, and loan
installments, and more recently, since November 2012, M-PESA
subscribers are now able to open interest earning bank deposit
accounts electronically through their phones. The accounts are
funded by transfer from the subscribers’ M-PESA accounts and
attract varying rates of interest. The subscribers will also be able to
borrow against funds held in their bank accounts.
Other notable services now offered through M-PESA also
include: the ability to purchase airtime for Safaricom’s cellular
service, the ability to use e-money to purchase goods and services
at M-PESA partner outlets, international money transfer services
currently offered in partnership with Western Union, M-Ticketing,
M-PESA prepaid Visa cards, promotional cash prize payments,
dividend payments, the ability to make charitable contributions, the
transfer of Loyalty Points, and the ability to use M-PESA as a
fundraising tool. The final category, M-PESA as a fundraising tool,
deserves special attention following the recent success of the
Kenyans for Kenya Famine Relief Initiative spearheaded by
Safaricom and other businesses. The fundraiser raised KES678
million (US$8.5 million), of which KES170 million (US$2.1
million), or about 25 percent, was contributed through M-PESA.
E. Financial Independence for Rural Communities and Female
Empowerment
Of course, M-PESA was not developed solely as a
50
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moneymaking enterprise. In fact, at inception, its explicit purpose
was to help achieve the United Nation’s Millennium Development
Goals. Thus, another measure of M-PESA’s success is the manner
in which it has helped reduce the impact of poverty for women and
children in rural Kenya.
Since M-PESA allows the safe transfer and storage of money,
rural Kenyans no longer need to make lengthy trips to urban areas
to make monthly payments for basic services, such as light or heat.
This saves not only time that would otherwise be directed toward
economically productive activity, but also money (on average
US$3 per transaction) that can be more usefully spent on food and
placed into long-term savings.
M-PESA also has the potential to increase net household
savings by “facilitat[ing] inter-personal transactions [that] improve
the allocation of savings across households and businesses by
[improving] the person-to-person credit market [and] . . .
increas[ing] the average return to capital [in that market] . . .
producing a feed-back to the level of saving.” 51 Whether this has
actually resulted is up for debate: “While some customers use MPESA as a savings device, [the service] still falls short of being a
useful [method of savings] for most [of Kenya’s] poor.” 52 As of
2009, the average savings balance of an M-PESA account was
around US$3. 53
Nevertheless, because M-PESA also makes the transfer of
funds across large distances comparatively inexpensive, rural
households are more likely to make efficient investments in human
capital by sending “members to high paying jobs in distant
locations . . . and [allowing them] to invest in skills that are likely
to earn a [greater economic] return” in places outside their
village. 54 Moreover, M-PESA allows rural households to
effectively spread risk. If a “risk-related effect arises,” M-PESA
allows a quick transfer of funds. 55 “Instead of waiting for
51
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conditions to worsen to levels that cause long-term damage, MPESA might enable support networks to keep negative shocks
[such as a medical emergency] manageable.” 56
Finally, M-PESA has increased the bargaining power of
weaker family members, in many cases women. These family
members can now expect “larger and more regular remittances
from better-off city-dwelling relatives” and can also create a
private place to store and manage their own funds, giving them a
level of financial independence previously unavailable to them. 57
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COUNTER-TERRORIST FINANCING REGULATIONS IMPLICATING
M-PESA
Despite its successes, one of the challenges M-PESA faces is
compliance with the ever-changing requirements of local and
international anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist
financing (CTF) programs. Although M-PESA is subject to the
same AML controls required of banks operating in Kenya, the
CBK and Kenya’s telecommunication regulator, the
Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK)—cognizant of the
risk posed by premature regulation of the mobile money
industry—have historically taken a very open and supportive
stance towards telecommunication operators seeking to provide
financial services to unbanked populations in Kenya. The
following sections seek to outline the manner in which AML
controls in Kenya have evolved in their application to services like
M-PESA.
A. The Application of Traditional Kenyan Banking Law to Mobile
Money
At the time of M-PESA’s launch, Kenya attempted to regulate
mobile money service providers only though an expansion of preexisting regulations applicable to traditional banks. Prior to 1990,
56
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the only measures taken to control mobile money laundering were
contained in generally applicable criminal laws (such as the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes Act) and guidelines issued by
the CBK, pursuant to the Kenyan Banking Act, seeking to
implement recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). These FATF Recommendations included: know your
customer (KYC) regulations, customer due diligence (CDD)
procedures, transaction monitoring requirements, watch list
screening procedures, suspicious activity reporting (SAR), and
mandatory record keeping. In December 2009, more stringent
regulations were imposed with the passage of the Proceeds of
Crime & Anti-Money Laundering Act (AML Act). Kenya’s AML
Act explicitly criminalized money laundering, provided
enforcement measures to the Kenya government (such as tracing
and seizure rights), and imposed severe penalties on money
launderers. Moreover, the FATF Recommendations previously
implemented only through CBK prudential guidelines became
mandatory for all financial service providers, including mobile
money service providers like Safaricom.
B. The CBK’s Electronic Payment Guidelines and Sector-Specific
Regulations
In 2011, the Kenyan government deviated from its regulatory
strategy of merely applying traditional banking law to mobile
money service providers by developing sector-specific guidelines
concerning mobile money and electronic payments. In consultation
with stakeholders including Safaricom, the CBK issued its
Electronic Payment Guidelines of 2011 and Retail Electronic
Transfer Guidelines of 2011. These regulations notably required
authorized electronic money issuers, such as Safaricom’s M-PESA
Holding Company (which holds funds on behalf of M-PESA
customers), to maintain a core capital of the greater of KES10
million or 1 percent of one-twelfth of the previous year’s total
turnover.
Following the release of the CBK’s e-money guidelines and a
substantial lobbying effort by Kenya’s banking industry, the
Kenyan Parliament began debating the potential for a new
payments law that would more rigorously control electronic
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payments and place mobile money on an equal regulatory footing
with comparable funds-transfer services provided by traditional
banking institutions. These debates culminated in the enactment of
the National Payment Systems Act (NPSA) in December 2011.
The NPSA brings all payment service providers, including
mobile phone service providers, into one regulatory framework
and provides the CBK with direct oversight of these providers to
ensure their safety and efficiency. Discussions are also currently
underway concerning the passage of a Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Bill
that will impose even further AML and CTF regulations on mobile
money service providers.
C. Compliance With and Voluntarily Imposed AML Programs in
Mobile Money
By all accounts, Safaricom’s M-PESA service has maintained
compliance with all applicable AML regulations and has remained
largely immune from corruption or misuse. In fact, in 2008, when
the traditional banking industry lobbied the Kenyan Finance
Minister to order an audit of the service, it was “declared . . . safe
and in line with the country’s objectives for financial inclusion”
with minimal incidences of fraud perpetrated by the use of the MPESA system were uncovered through the audit. 58 Safaricom’s
own internal and voluntary AML procedures are largely
responsible for this result.
As with any major financial service, however, there have been
reported cases of fraud and social engineering scams whereby
unsuspecting subscribers have lost money to confidence tricksters.
Thus, the financial innovations that have transformed M-PESA
into a major payment service with millions of transactions worth
billions of dollars annually should be developed hand in hand with
appropriate controls to protect the M-PESA service from being
used as an easy tool for money laundering and terrorism financing.
In this regard, Safaricom has proactively developed and
implemented a comprehensive set of internal AML policies and
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procedures including: (1) agent training, (2) internal KYC policies,
and (3) strict transaction monitoring.
1. Staff and Agent Training for M-PESA Providers
For many aspects of the M-PESA service, Safaricom only
works directly with “master agents” who in turn are entrusted with
the control of retail sub-agents. However, there is one area over
which Safaricom maintains tight and direct control: staff and agent
training. Safaricom maintains this control, in part, to ensure that
M-PESA’s users receive a consistent and positive experience
regardless of which agent they choose to patronize, but also to
comply with Safaricom’s AML and CTF policies. Before a new
agent is authorized to provide the M-PESA service, Safaricom
provides in-depth and comprehensive agent training that covers all
aspects of the service, as well as Safaricom’s AML, CTF, and
KYC procedures. Additionally, staff members at all levels are
taken through formal and web-based AML awareness training. The
program, adapted from the AML policy instituted by the Vodafone
Group, encompasses all aspects of the M-PESA service and is
annually audited by the Vodafone Group Money Laundering
Reporting Office to ensure its effectiveness.
2. Identity Verification and “Know Your Customer” Procedures
in M-PESA
M-PESA customers and agents are also subject to
comprehensive KYC verification and CDD checks to protect MPESA and related services from being used for money laundering.
These procedures include an automated watch-list screening
program (screening both for Politically Exposed Persons and
persons on international sanctions lists) and a KYC regime
requiring retail agents to “validate a customer’s identity during
each transaction using [a] national ID card presented by the
customer.” 59 Should a customer or agent present a moneylaundering risk, appropriate deterrent action is taken resulting,
59
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when applicable, in the investigation and prosecution of suspects
by the relevant law enforcement agencies.
3. Transactional Controls
In addition to the KYC controls mentioned above, Safaricom
has implemented a number of transactional controls, including
transactional limits and ongoing transaction monitoring to detect
suspicious activity and prevent money laundering.
M-PESA transactions are closely monitored through an
automated Transaction Monitoring System with appropriate
exception parameters, based on set transactional patterns. Any
exception alerts generated by the system are investigated and
appropriate action is taken to close the account and/or to escalate
the matter to management or the relevant law enforcement
agencies for resolution.
Transaction limits are set at KES70,000 (approximately
US$900) per transaction with a maximum daily limit of
KES140,000 (approximately US$1800) for cash deposits,
transfers, and withdrawals, a maximum holding limit of
KES100,000 (approximately US$800), and a KES10,000
(approximately US$130) limit for airtime purchases. System
restrictions are in place to prevent any attempt to circumvent these
limits. Further,
Retail agents are also required to record transactions
in a paper log book. For each transaction, the agent
enters: the M[-]PESA balance, the date, agent ID,
transaction ID, transaction type (customer deposit
or withdrawal, agent cash rebalancing), value,
customer phone number, customer name, and the
customer’s national ID number. Most of this
information is copied from the confirmation SMS
that the agent receives. Customers are then asked to
sign the log for each transaction, which helps to
discourage fraud. The log book is branded by
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Safaricom and all retail agents use the same
format. 60
All transactional information is stored electronically on the MPESA platform, appropriate reports of those transactions are made
available to customers and compliance officers, and suspicious
transactions are automatically reported in compliance with
Kenya’s AML and CTF programs.
CONCLUSION
What lessons can be drawn from the development of M-PESA
in Kenya? First, there are a number of characteristics of Kenya’s
population and culture that generated a unique demand for
remittance services and made Kenya especially supportive of MPESA’s development. However, Safaricom’s diverse agent
network, robust money transfer platform, low price, and strong
mobile infrastructure were able to generate the trust, convenience,
and brand recognition necessary to ensure early and consistently
high levels of M-PESA service adoption.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, M-PESA’s success in
Kenya is due, at least in part, to the enabling environment provided
by regulators such as the CBK and the CCK. The passage of
Kenya’s NPSA and related legislation, coupled with increasing
international efforts seeking to tighten control over mobile
payment service providers might significantly alter the regulatory
landscape for services like M-PESA and guide their progress in the
future.
The development of AML and CTF efforts, however, is not a
one-way street. In fact, the most recent Mobile Financial Services
Risk Matrix issued by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) Booz Allen Hamilton group was developed
largely by incorporating Safaricom’s own risk mitigation policies,
procedures, and processes. Thus, it is evident that Safaricom and
its successful implementation of the M-PESA service in Kenya
will continue to have an important influence on the development of
60
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mobile financial services and the future of international AML
efforts.

